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Flags of Convenience:  
Legal Issues in relation to Fishing the Southern Ocean 
 
 
“A merchant fleet is not an artificial creation. It is a reality which corresponds to 
certain indispensable requirements of a national economy. . . The flag - that supreme 
emblem of sovereignty which international law authorises a ship to fly - must 
represent a country’s degree of economic independence, not the interests of third 
parties or companies.”  





Flags of Convenience (FOC), whereby states open their fishing registries to nationals 
other than their own, can be particularly lucrative, especially if the owner intends to 
flout international standards on fishing standards in the Southern Ocean (DeSombre 
2005). Fishing within the Southern Ocean falls under the regime of the 1980 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). 
Ocean regulation is difficult because of the vastness of the ocean and the number of 
ships whose behaviour influences the success of international regulatory efforts 
(DeSombre 2005). In response, a number of initiatives under both CCAMLR and the 
newly founded High Seas Task Force (HSTF) are attempting to combat Illegal 
Unreported Unregulated (IUU) fishing.  
 
There are large difficulties in the logistics of High Seas regulation that creates 
loopholes in the current IUU Southern Ocean system. Using FOCs of states that are 
not signatories to International agreements such as CCAMLR intensifies the problem, 
as they are not legally bound to abide by any measures implemented by international 
agreement. The use of FOCs by a number of CCAMLR nationals is evident yet 
current trends in international economy and business make these ‘front companies’ 
particularly difficult to apprehend (Australian Antarctic Division, 2003). 
 
Upon sourcing information, no books or journal articles were found to focus solely on 
FOC in the Southern Ocean. Very few focused specifically on FOCs. There are few 
varying observations because there is often only one of them. 
 
 
Flags of Convenience 
 
FOC or ‘open registration’ is as old as the Spanish Main2. FOCs have been used for 
everything from supplying booze during the 1920s prohibition, to helping escape 
                                                 
1 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, ICJ Reports 
(1960) 145 [hereinafter IMCO]. 
2 The Spanish Main was the Caribbean coast of the Spanish Empire in mainland Central and South America. From the 16th to 
the 18th century the Spanish Main was the point of departure for enormous wealth in the form of gold, silver, gems, spices, 
hardwoods, hides and other treasures. The famous Spanish treasure fleets transported these to Spain. The traffic in treasure made 
the Spanish Main a haunt of pirates and privateers. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Main)  
European and North American unions that had driven up crew costs (Anonymous 
1997). Surprisingly however there is little information in relation to FOCs, 
particularly in relation to fishing in the Southern Ocean.  
 
The FOC system is where states have opened up the ship registration process – 
historically only nationals of a given state were eligible to register their vessels – to 
ships belonging to people who are not citizens or residents of the state. Ship 
registration confers a form of nationality: a ship must follow only the domestic and 
international obligations taken on by the state in which it is registered (DeSombre 
2005). Currently you can go to a web site and register under any number of FOCs 
with ease (International Ship Registries 2006). 
 
Although his research is highly dated, Van Fossen (1992) was the only material found 
to report on the impact FOCs were having on the open registry states. There was a 
huge rise in the Pacific Island’s Flags of Convenience (PIFOCs) in the late 1980s. He 
defines PIFOCs as “devices by which small and weak states rent aspects of their 
sovereignty to capitalists, who pay for greater freedom of action outside core 
regulatory structures and high-waged protected core labour” (Van Fossen 1992, p20). 
Van Fossen concludes, “Registration fees benefit the indigenous elites in the capitals 
of PIFOC-issuing countries and tie them to serving the interests of global capitalism, 
although in different ways.”  
 
 
FOCs: Fishing in the Southern Ocean 
 
Regulation of High Seas fishing has only been an issue since the introduction of catch 
quotas under international law. Elevated restrictions on fishing quota ensure market 
prices stay high for fish such as the Patagonian toothfish. This creates ideal conditions 
for a lucrative business in the IUU fishing trade. Fishing vessels simply sidestep 
fishing quota costs and restrictions. FOCs can then help to improve their chances of 
evading detection and if detected dodging any reprimand within agreements such as 
CCAMLR. 
 
The only figures found to give some sort of perspective on the size of the problem 
were from a non-verifiable Greenpeace survey that included 34 vessels. Ten were 
found to be flag of convenience (FOC) vessels, two with no name at all, three vessels 
with two names, two with the same name, 27 that displayed no country or port or 
registry and nine that had been sighted previously engaged in illegal operations 
(Greenpeace International, October 2002). The Australian Antarctic Division (2003) 
put IUU fishing as the ‘number one threat to the conservation of fisheries’. 
 
The Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics in its Shipping Statistics Yearbook 
2003 identified the four leading open-registry fishing states as: 
• Belize 
• Panama  
• Honduras 
• St Vincent and the Grenadines 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) revealed the 
up and coming FOC fisheries include: 
• Bolivia 
• Georgia 
• Cambodia  
• Vanuatu  
(DeSombre 2005) 
Australia continues to have trouble with Uruguay and Togo FOCs illegally fishing 
within the Australian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around Heard Island and 
McDonald Islands in the Southern Ocean (Molenaar 2004). 
 
The advantages for FOC states to offer ship registration are numerous, most 
noticeably to raise income from registration fees and taxes. In an effort to increase the 
number of ship registrations, and thereby the revenue gained from them, these states 
often avoid taking costly international regulations such as CCAMLR. Ship owners 
who want to avoid being bound by international regulation can choose to register their 
ships in these open registries (DeSombre 2005).  
 
For those who operate them, fishing vessels flagged in open registries can be 
particularly lucrative, especially if the owner intends to ignore international standards 
set by convention. For example, IUUs operate outside the directive of the 
International Labour Organization Convention and if national laws are weak, 
employee treatment is not regulated. Employment crew costs account for up to 30 
percent of total catch value for nationally registered vessels, which would give an 
IUU huge financial benefit if regulations were not adhered to. Taxes are also lower, 
and many states that offer FOC operate as tax havens as well, decreasing even further 
any tax burden. Most important, however, is the opportunity to fish without having to 





In the last few decades, contemporary international law has created two conventions; 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Convention 
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLA). Both 
regulate what was once a ‘global commons’, a free for all, outside of sovereign 
control. ‘Third state’ parties that have not yet signed up either of these conventions 
are still not legally bound by them. Both conventions continue to struggle for 
jurisdiction to control these waters (Bray 2000).  
 
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
 
In the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) the 
capacity was created for coastal states to assert vast maritime claims over waters 
adjacent to their coastlines, creating the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This new 
regime, in combination with parallel initiatives to regulate some aspects of high seas 
fishing activities, has meant that ‘legal’ fishing on the high seas (‘global commons’) is 
now subject to extensive regulations (Rothwell & Stephens 2004).  
 
 Commission on the Convention of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLA)  
 
“After 21 years of operation, CCAMLR is now considered one of the most developed 
and sophisticated regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs)” (Rothwell 
& Stephens 2004, p173). With 24 state members, its measures are precautionary in 
nature and primarily directed towards the operations of its member states. Upon 
becoming a CCAMLR signatory, the country must then ratify these measures into 
national law. This extends the CAMLR mandate to the countries nationals. 
 
Since these regulations have tightened IUU fishing has increased and is becoming an 
increasingly significant challenge to the authority of CCAMLR to manage. It is a dual 
problem. Firstly ensuring ‘internal compliance’ by CCAMLR parties with its 
Conservation Measures and secondly, tackling the fishing activities of vessels flying 
flags of non-Member States (FOCs).  
 
CCAMLR generally lacks the teeth to give contracting parties an incentive to improve 
their compliance records. This was painfully illustrated at the 22nd Annual CCAMLR 
Meeting (2003), when the Russian Federation blocked consensus to ensure that none 
of its vessels would appear on CCAMLR’s IUU Vessel List (Molenaar 2004). 
 
The implications for CCAMLR are that taking an increasingly tougher stand towards 
non-contracting parties is becoming more difficult to justify. If contracting parties to 
CCAMLR will not abide by the restrictions, countries in a position to offer lucrative 
FOC deals are unlikely to think twice about their options. 
 
 
Legal Issues: Confronting the Regulation of FOCs 
 
There are a number of legal issues relating to the ineffectiveness of combating FOCs. 
Total enforcement of the “Law of the High Seas” is virtually impossible due state 
sovereignty3 issues. Imposing restrictions on state activities is an impingement on the 
recognised freedoms of that state to be governed only by their own internal laws. In 
addition, if IUU perpetrators are caught in the act, there are plenty of loopholes for 
both convention signatories and third states. 
 
 Sovereignty Issues 
 
Van Fossen (1992) was the only notable source that looked at FOCs from a 
perspective of historical impacts on FOCs. He views the FOC system as being 
justified in international law largely by the doctrine of the sovereign equality of states 
and flag state control over vessels. He perceives the conflicting issues surrounding 
FOCs as being generally accepted and widely acknowledged. Van Fossen’s position is 
that conflicting interpretations of the High Seas doctrine by Third World states, labour 
unions and environmentalists (as well as their own incompatible objectives) have 
weakened and fragmented the anti-FOC campaign. Those countries who have 
historically played a vital role in developing FOCs, predominantly lawyers, have done 
so by exploiting loopholes in the prevailing conceptions of sovereignty (Van Fossen 
1992). 
 
 Use of “Front Companies” 
 
Vessels flagged to CCAMLR Members, are often owned by ‘front companies’ hiding 
behind a corporate veil. ‘Front companies’ are the most visible ‘tip’ of a usually 
complex, trans-national corporate structure deliberately constructed to disguise the 
identity of the beneficial owners. The beneficiaries are very difficult to link 
conclusively to the IUU fishing (Australian Antarctic Division 2003).  
                                                 
3 “The exclusive right to exercise supreme political power over that state” (Molenaar 2004, p19). 
 
When Hopper (1999) looked into where these ‘front countries’ were based he found 
that many were nationals of CCAMLR nations. “Although not condoned by the 
governments concerned, it has been taking place from within the organisation which 
set itself up to provide stewardship of the area. But that does no dissolve those 
governments of responsibility” (Hopper 1999, p6-7). 
 
 Need for a “Genuine Link” 
 
The FOC institution depends on a system of international law. Article 91 of the 
UNLOS conventions provides that “ships have the nationality of the State whose flag 
they are entitled to fly. There must exist a ‘genuine link’ (emphasis added) between 
the State and the ship”. Defenders contend that the link is genuine when the formal 
legal connections to the owner in the FOC country are completed through formal 
agreement. In contrast, opponents object that the ownership structures are shams 
designed to prevent or inhibit the creation of a new and more just oceanic system 
(Van Fossen 1992).  
 
Recent work done by Robin Churchill from the University of Cardiff gives some 
guidance based on case law and various agreements. Churchill (2000) concludes 
“Registration does not in itself, make that link genuine … A State has a discretion as 
to how it ensures that the link between itself and a ship having its nationality is 
genuine”. However, the State must warrant it can “demonstrate that it is able 
effectively to exercise its jurisdiction and control over a ship, a State must be able to 
show that the necessary mechanisms for such exercise are in place at the time when 
the ship is granted its nationality” (Churchill 2000, p.4-5). 
 
However, the definition has not yet been tested in a court of law and is still only 
relevant to those who have signed up to UNLOS and are willing to go to the 
International Court of Justice for trial (Churchill 2000). 
 
 A Requirement for “Prompt Release”  
 
UNCLOS is sending particularly mixed messages about illegal fishing and FOCs. 
Article 73(1) of the UNCLOS Convention requires “arrested vessels and their crews 
shall be promptly released upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other security” 
(United Nations Law of the Sea 1982). 
 
The contemporary connection between IUU fishing and prompt release cases clearly 
poses a challenge for the international community. Associated with this development 
has been the growth in open registries. The cloak of protection provided by flags of 
convenience in a globalised fishing industry has made it doubly difficult for effective 
prosecution of illegal fishing operators. An arrested fishing vessel can be released re-
flagged, re-named and re-crewed so as to return to engage in further IUU activities, 
makes combating these activities all the more difficult. It is clear that a phenomenon 
has developed which demands strong action by coastal States. (Rothwell & Stephens 
2004) 
 
IUU fishing and FOC states have been able to persist and arguably, thrive, through the 
operation of two key principles of international law. The right to the freedom of 
fishing on the high seas and the principle of flag state authority have operated to allow 
fishers to exercise their high seas rights whilst concurrently avoiding regulation if 
they choose to do so. (Baird 2005) 
 
There are few controls designed solely for dealing with FOC. The predominant 
method is to persuade or ‘shame’ those states with open registries to putting tighter 
restrictions on vessel registrations. These states are often developing nations and have 
little to loose upon accepting bribes.  
 
Often those nationals registering their boats with FOCs are also members of 
CCAMLR. However, contemporary international law is yet to bear its teeth into those 
leading the crime. Continued and large-scale non-compliance by contracting parties to 
the CCAMLR Convention undermines the CCAMLR Commission’s credibility, 
authority and effectiveness. This could cause a downward spiral as more states see a 
‘get rich quick’ way to make money. 
 
 
Measures for Combating FOCs 
 
Avoidance of reprimand is primarily made possible by the inability of coastal states 
and RFMOs to take action on the high seas against rogue fishers and the inability or 
unwillingness of certain flag states to exercise effective control over their flagged 
fishing vessels (Baird 2005). 
 
There is very little literature on combating the means of FOCs themselves. Because of 
the sovereign position each country holds, these countries are free to do as they please 
with few impacts. The efforts of international organisations can only go as far as to 
persuade open registry states to join the relevant fishery management agreements. 
These efforts have had little impact on their own (DeSombre 2005).  
 
The most effective efforts to persuade states with open registry to join agreements, or 
individual ship owners to uphold them regardless of their legal obligation to do so, 
have come through the use of trade restrictions (DeSombre 2005). However, because 
of the highly political nature of international agreements and the influence of external 
political activities, measures for combating FOCs by means of political pressure and 
sanction is at times a highly controversial topic. 
 
Listed below are the current measures for combating IUU fishing activity in the 
Southern Ocean. Purely through their regulatory process, these measures also enhance 
the efforts to decrease FOCs. There are a number of regional and global organisations 
trialling the various methods.  
 
 Measures taken by CCAMLR 
 
• Port state controls under international law 
• Catch Documentation Schemes (CDS)  
o CDS documents where and by whom the fish was caught. The fish 
is given a certificate that is progressively checked from the dock 
where it is unloaded to those buying at the fish markets.  
• Automated satellite-linked Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) 
o  VMS monitors the location of fishing vessels- then analysis and 
presents this information to the monitoring and surveillance 
personal.  
• Vessel lists  
• Ministerial High Seas Task Force (HSTF)   
 
 High Seas Task Force  
 
A Ministerial High Seas Task Force (HSTF) was established under the auspices of the 
Round Table on Sustainable Development at the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development in December 2003.  
The HSTF covers all areas of the High Sea whether controlled by a nation or not, 
whether the flag ship is covered or if the catch has not been reported. It is simply 
covers “fishing in violation of national or international obligations” (Baird 2005, 
p2). 
The goal of the High Seas Task Force was to set priorities among a series of practical 
proposals for confronting the challenge of IUU fishing on the high seas. The end 
result was a pragmatic and prioritized action plan that was both analytically sound and 
politically saleable and would act as a catalyser (See Figure 1 for ‘Proposals for 
Action of High Seas Task Force’) (HSTF 2006). 
 
There is little to convince that the HSTF may have any differing effect to that of 
previous efforts. The few initiatives expressed are primarily extensions of what 
CCAMLR has done previously. 
 
 New Zealand’s Efforts 
 
All operators of New Zealand (NZ) registered vessels must have a high seas fishing 
permit if they want to take or transport fish on the high seas. In addition, all New 
Zealand nationals using foreign vessels on the high seas must have an authorisation 
(equivalent to a high seas fishing permit) from the government to which that vessel is 
"flagged" (See Figure 3: NZ Fisheries Act Section 113E). 
 
In the past NZ has taken a hands-on approach to deterring IUUs off our Southern 
Shores. Operation Mawsone in 1998 flew 15 patrols, starting at about 60 degrees 
south latitude and going down to 74 degrees south. NZ’s view is that “In this case the 
national strategy was to go down there, catch people in the act of conducting illegal 
fisheries and then, as a political imperative, show photographs and evidence to the 
world media. The task was to project New Zealand’s foreign policy out into the world 
through the media” (Hopper 1999, p7). 
 
 Greenpeace International 
 
In true Greenpeace style, the legendary NGO continues to chase down ‘pirates’, chain 
together FOCs in German Ports and have recently been instructed to remove 
themselves from the top of a crane unloading FOC vessels in Las Palmas. Grass roots 
action is another valuable way to create unwanted attention for FOC countries, in the 
hopes that it will make governments sit up and pay attention (Greenpeace 
International 2006). 
 
In order for FOC fishing to be combated effectively, multiple strategies are required 
including action through multiple organisations such as the FAO, regionally through 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) such as CCAMRA, sub-
regional and bi-lateral agreements. Legitimate trade measures and initiatives such as 
the CDS, plus international institutions such as International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (ILTOS). 
 
 
A Brief Conclusion 
 
Flags of Convenience (FOCs) and Illegal Unregulated Unreported fishing vessels 
(IUUs) in the Southern Ocean are having large impacts on fisheries and fisheries 
management. Although exact figures are not obtainable, Greenpeace International 
found a third of the vessels intersected were IUUs (Greenpeace International, October 
2002). For companies that operate vessels, fishing vessels flagged in open registries 
can be particularly lucrative. For countries with open registries, having IUUs is 
equally as profitable. However, Van Fossen also points out the negative impacts of 
the FOC trade on the open registry states. Increasing corruption and the limitation of 
national identity in developing states created by the onslaught of FOCs are some of 
the impacts mentioned (Van Fossen 1992). 
 
For any substantial progress in respect to FOCs, measures must be tightened. 
Consequences for engaging in FOC and IUU must be visible to other states that may 
see this as a benefit. Poorer countries need more support in patrolling their waters and 
ports to ensure that those boats that are taking on their state flags are abiding by their 
national laws. 
 
Available information about this topic is meagre. There is little focus on this 
particular aspect of law. Impacts on the Southern Ocean fisheries and ecology are 
noted but literature only scrapes the surface of a highly political subject. DeSombre 
article was very helpful in looking at the initial issues involved in open registries. Van 
Fossen’s material, although very dated, outlining the deeper issues about FOC was 
particularly helpful and the only source to analyse the state FOCs.  
 
The topic of IUUs and FOCs are particularly political and at times highly volatile. 
Although there is a huge issue and the impacts are well known, there is also huge 























 Figure 1: Proposals for Action of High Seas Task Force  
 
1) Strengthen the International Monitoring Control and Surveillance Network. 
 
2) Establish a global information system on high seas fishing vessels. 
3) Promote broader participation in the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
(UNFSA) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
Compliance Agreement. 
4) Promote better high seas governance by: 
A. Developing a model for improved governance by RFMOs; 
B. Independent review of Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) 
performance; 
C. Encouraging RFMOs to work more effectively through better coordination; and 
D. Supporting initiatives to bring all unregulated high seas fisheries under effective 
governance. 
 
5) Adopt and promote guidelines on flag state performance. 
 
6) Support greater use of port and trade measures by: 
A. Promoting the concept of responsible port states; promoting the FAO Model Port 
State Scheme as the international minimum standard for regional port state controls 
and supporting FAO’s proposal to develop an electronic database of port state 
measures; 
B. Reviewing domestic port state measures to ensure they meet international 
minimum standards; and 
C. Strengthening domestic legislation controlling import of IUU product. 
 
7) Fill critical gaps in scientific knowledge and assessment. 
 
8) Address the needs of developing countries. 
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 Figure 3: NZ Fisheries Act Section 113E 
 
PROHIBITION ON USING FOREIGN-FLAGGED VESSELS  
Section 113E of the Fisheries Act prohibits New Zealand nationals from using vessels 
that are not registered under the Ship Registration Act 1992 to take fish on the high 
seas. This prohibition is waived if the New Zealand national has an authorisation from 
a country that meets certain criteria (this is discussed in more detail below). There are 
two aspects of this prohibition worth clarifying:  
 
A New Zealand national 
Section 2 of the Fisheries Act 1996 defines a New Zealand national as:  
(a) A New Zealand citizen; 
(b) A person who is ordinarily resident in New Zealand 
(c) A body corporate established by or under New Zealand law  
 
Registration under the Ship Registration Act 1992  
New Zealand nationals using vessels that are not registered under the Ship 
Registration Act are subject to section 113E of the Fisheries Act. This means that the 
national must:  
Either:  
Register the vessel under the Ship Registration Act and apply for a New Zealand high 
seas fishing permit;  
Or:  
Apply for an authorisation from the state to which the vessel is currently registered 
(making sure that the state is one of those that falls within the categories listed in 
section 113E).  
 
Authorising States 
Section 113E provides that the prohibition on the use of foreign vessels on the high 
seas by New Zealand national operators may be waived if the vessel's activities are 
covered by an authorisation from another country. However, the country issuing the 
authorisation must:  
• Be a party to the United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement);  
• Be a party to the FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessel on the High Seas;  
• Be a party to, or have accepted the obligations of, a global regional, or sub-
regional fisheries organisation or arrangement to which the authorisation 
relates; or  
• Have signed the Fish Stocks Agreement and have the legislative and 
administrative mechanisms in place to control its vessels on the high seas in 
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